FELICITY CONDITIONS

Allan refers to the 4 Felicity Conditions discussed by Austin: Preparatory, Executive, Sincerity and Fulfilment conditions, although he believes that the only one (of Austin’s original felicity conditions) that remains obligatory in the definitions of all illocutions is the Preparatory Condition.

First, he dismisses Fulfilment Conditions as irrelevant to a Linguistic theory of speech acts since they have to do with the meaning of the utterance.

Second, he argues that Executive Conditions may not always be valid for all illocutionary acts (except for declarations of states of affairs).

Third, the author believes that Sincerity Conditions reflect on whether or not S upholds the Preparatory Conditions.

In conclusion, he claims that whether an illocutionary act is felicitous or not will depend entirely on the observation of the Preparatory Conditions.

I agree with this assertion, since I believe that the Preparatory Conditions of an illocutionary act already imply its Sincerity and Executive Conditions. In other words, since the Preparatory Conditions “provide the grounds for motivating S to make U”, it is assumed that S already has the tools and the information about the circumstances to evaluate also the Sincerity and Executive Conditions.

The only one of Austin’s original felicity conditions that remains obligatory in the definitions of all illocutions is the preparatory condition. Preparatory conditions identify what ought to be presupposed in a felicitous use of the illocution.

oToday, the only executive condition which still seems warranted is one on declarations.
oSincerity reflects on whether or not S upholds the preparatory conditions and can be captured by generally applicable conditions on language use.
oLinguists rarely attend to fulfilment conditions, nor should they since they are not concerned with the perlocutionary effects of utterances

I agree with Austin’s arguments since the preparatory conditions identify the particular circumstances appropriate to performing a given illocutionary act. They provide the grounds for motivating S to make the utterance and grounds from which H will evaluate the illocutionary act expressed in it.

Allan believes that the only felicity condition that remains untouchable is the PREPARATORY CONDITION since:

* As regards the EXECUTIVE CONDITION, they are only valid for declarations of states of affairs, such as marriage, job appointment/termination, umpiring. For the rest of the illocutionary acts, they may or may not be valid.

* As regards the SINCERITY CONDITION, sincerity reflects on whether or not the Speaker upholds the preparatory conditions.

* As regards the FULFILMENT CONDITION, since it is dependent on the meaning of the utterance, this condition is irrelevant to a linguistic theory of speech acts.

I agree with his arguments since, as he states, PREPARATORY CONDITIONS identify the particular circumstances appropriate to performing a given illocutionary act. They provide the grounds for motivating the Speaker to make an utterance and grounds from which the Hearer will evaluate the illocutionary act expressed in the utterance.

Allan believes that the only conditions that remain are the preparatory conditions.

As regards the fulfilment conditions, he believes they are not relevant to linguists since they are related to the perlocutionary effect of utterances.

Besides, he claims executive conditions are not applicable to all speech acts but to some declarations.

Finally, sincerity conditions depend on wether they uphold the preparatory conditions or not.

I agree with his arguments since after all, the conditions that are applicable to all illocutionary acts and that identify the circumstances appropiate to performing them are the PREPARATORY conditions. The other conditions are either irrelevant to linguists or dependent on the preparatory ones.

According to Allan, the only condition that remains untouchable is the preparatory one.
He considers:
-the fulfilment condition irrelevant to a linguistic theory of speech acts.
-executive condition is only valid for certain declarations.
- the sincerity condition reflect on whether or not S uphold the preparatory conditions, so only one sincerity condition should be necessary. That is to say this can be captured by generally applicable conditions on language use.
I agree with his arguments since, as he says, “these conditions provide the grounds for motivating S to make the utterance and grounds from which H will evaluate the illocutionary act expressed in the utterance”. Still, I consider all the conditions that Austin proposes are necessary to make successful any illocutionary act.

Allan believes that the only one of Austin's original felicity conditions that remains obligatory in the definitions of all illocutions is the preparatory because it provides the grounds for motivating S to make the utterance and grounds from which H will evaluate the illocutionary act expressed in the utterance.
I agree with his arguments since by evaluating the circumstances of the speech act beforehand,H can infer the other 3 conditions.

Of all the four felicity conditions: preparatory, executive, sincerity and fulfillment, Austin believes that the former remains untouchable since the other three conditions rely on the preparatory one to be valid for declaration. Quoting Allan's overview "The statement of preparatory conditions is obligatory in definitions of illocutions."

I agree with Austin's point of view because in the way he presents it, the preparatory condition establishes the appropriate circumstances for the speech act to take place. We can also say that if there is no speech act either written or spoken, there are no felicity conditions to be fulfilled.